This year, for the first time ever, nearly all of the world’s countries are making pledges to help limit future climate change. As of 1 October 2015, 147 countries (representing about 85% of global emissions) have submitted their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions. These pledges, if carried out in full, are expected to lower emissions relative to the ‘business as usual’ forecast. However, they are not expected to prevent emissions from increasing above today’s level through 2030. To meet the global goal of limiting mean global temperature change to 2°C relative to the pre-industrial level, much more will need to be done after 2030. Eventually, emissions will have to fall to zero worldwide – either that, or countries will need to remove carbon dioxide directly from the atmosphere. This new Vox eBook looks into what needs to be done to build a climate regime that is both workable and effective.
Promoting green growth requires well-designed institutions and environmental policy instruments that are effective in achieving their environmental objectives without imposing excessive burdens on the economy. There is growing recognition in OECD countries that economic instruments such as environmentally related taxes can be effective in stimulating a shift to less-damaging forms of production and consumption while providing producers and consumers with flexibility in making these adjustments. Behavioural changes stimulated by economic instruments may lead to the creation of new jobs and employment opportunities. Investments in new "cleaner" technology can be an important source of employment and business development. Where economic instruments generate revenues, the appropriate deployment of these revenues can also make a significant contribution to enhancing incomes and growth.
Environmental impacts are increasing due to human activities. The overuse of the benefits nature provides us is the direct result of our failure to put a price on these benefits. One way of addressing this is to require environmental compensation.
This study provides an overview of key conditions for increased, flexible and cost-effective application of compensation. It shows that for a relatively small cost, society can make a significant investment in the provision of biodiversity and ecosystem services by requiring compensation.
The study outlines three main recommendations on how to increase the use of environmental compensation: stimulating supply of, and demand for compensation; clarifying guidelines and legal framework; and strengthening Nordic cooperation on compensation.
Negotiations on climate change have made little tangible progress since the early 1990s. Much of the failure to make diplomatic progress reflects that the problem is structurally extremely difficult to solve. This paper focuses on one among the many institutional reforms that could allow for more progress—making a greater effort in small groups, or “clubs.” Framing climate deals in smaller groups—designed in a way that encourages expansion of membership and linkages among groups over time—could allow for greater flexibility and reduce the effort and complexity of required deal making. This club approach to diplomacy would not eliminate the need to work in maxilateral, global forums such as the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Outlining the problems with the status quo, the paper identifies major tasks that clubs could perform. They could help to provide a forum for enthusiastic countries to “do the deals” that would get reluctant countries to make bigger efforts.
The long-standing reaction of the trade community to attempts to embroil trade law and policy in the resolution of the climate change issue has been to say, “Solve your own problems on the basis of your own agreed multilateral instruments, and when you have, if there are interfaces or overlaps between your regime and the trade regime, we will find means of resolving them constructively.” While this is understandable, it is rendered impractical, first by that an effective set of agreed international climate mitigation policies, which stand a chance of allowing the achievement of the agreed objectives, is probably as far away now as it has ever been; and second by that the development of domestic politics in both developed and developing countries has revealed trade to be in principle a major source of carbon and political leakage from any aggressive mitigation regime, and thus a serious constraint on national and international mitigation plans.