Over 200 years ago, Adam Smith put forward the notion that individuals seeking to benefit themselves through trade were led as if by an invisible hand to a situation in which society as a whole could benefit. It can be argued, however, that social objectives such as sustainability and inclusiveness, do not emerge spontaneously through market forces. Such outcomes have to be designed through legal structures and institutions. In other words, for the invisible hand to operate, there needs to be a visible hand behind it.
By reviewing the financial inclusion experiments in South Africa and Kenya, this working paper provides some lessons for the design of the type of financial sector required for the transition from greed to green.
Policy-driven institutions such as national development banks (NDBs) and national green funds (NGFs) attract a growing interest to provide grants, credit-enhancement instruments or lend directly to project proponents in specific green sectors, with billions of dollars allocated by governments to support these interventions.
As part of ongoing efforts to better understand their comparative effectiveness to deepen national financial systems, the paper discusses the role of NGFs in catalysing institutional innovations and facilitating access to long-term affordable finance for green, low carbon and climate resilient investment. It argues that the key added value of NGFs might rest in their capacity to foster institutional innovations and partner with other financial and regulatory institutions to increase the diversity and depth of local financial markets in order to enhance the domestic supply of green finance.
This study seeks to provide new perspectives and proposals on the relationship between institutional investors and sustainable development in the context of a more sustainable financial system. The report’s key messages advocate for systemic and dynamic policy reform that better aligns institutional investors with policy goals for sustainable development. Seven critical policy objectives that hold the strongest potential for positive change are explored in the report together with fourteen policy tools to get us there.
The paper presents a theoretical model of a different and more sustainable role for financial agents and markets that is justified by systematic philosophical arguments and reasoning. It is normative rather than descriptive, and does not review how the financial system currently functions, but rather how it ought to function in the future. The goal is to identify a new direction for finance which the majority of commentators will recognize as both desirable and achievable.
Fiscal considerations may shift governmental priorities away from environmental concerns: finance ministers face strong demand for public expenditures such as infrastructure investments but they are constrained by international tax competition. We develop a multi-region model of tax competition and resource extraction to assess the fiscal incentive of imposing a tax on carbon rather than on capital. We explicitly model international capital and resource markets, as well as intertemporal capital accumulation and resource extraction. While fossil resources give rise to scarcity rents, capital does not. With carbon taxes, the rents can be captured and invested in infrastructure, which leads to higher welfare than under capital taxation. This result holds even without modeling environmental damages. It is robust under a variation of the behavioral assumptions of resource importers to coordinate their actions, and a resource exporter’s ability to counteract carbon policies. Further, no green paradox occurs—instead, the carbon tax constitutes a viable green policy, since it postpones extraction and reduces cumulative emissions.