Policies must balance forest conservation’s local costs with its benefits—local to global—in terms of biodiversity, the mitigation of climate change, and other eco-services such as water quality. The trade-offs with development vary across forest locations. This article argues that considering location in three ways helps to predict policy impact and improve policy choice: (i) policy impacts vary by location because baseline deforestation varies with characteristics (market distances, slopes, soils, etc.) of locations in a landscape; (ii) different mixes of political-economic pressures drive the location of different policies; and (iii) policies can trigger ‘second-order’ or ‘spillover’ effects likely to differ by location. This article provides empirical evidence that suggests the importance of all three considerations, by reviewing high-quality evaluations of the impact of conservation and development on forest. Impacts of well-enforced conservation rise with private clearing pressure, supporting (i). Protection types (e.g. federal/state) differ in locations and thus in impacts, supporting (ii).
The objective of this research is to identify and quantify the motivations for organic grain farming in the United States. Survey data of US organic grain producers were used in regression models to find the statistical determinants of three motivations for organic grain production, including profit maximization, environmental stewardship, and an organic lifestyle. Results provide evidence that many organic grain producers had more than a single motivation and that younger farmers are more likely to be motivated by environmental and lifestyle goals than older farmers. Organic grain producers exhibited a diversity of motivations, including profit and stewardship.
The restitution of parkland to the Khomani San “bushmen” and Mier “agricultural” communities in May 2002 marked a significant shift in conservation in the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park and environs in South Africa. Biodiversity conservation will benefit from this land restitution only if the Khomani San, who interact with nature more than do other groups, are good environmental stewards. To assess their attitude toward biodiversity conservation, this study used the contingent valuation method to investigate the economic values the communities assign to biodiversity conservation under three land tenure arrangements in the Kgalagadi area. For each community and land tenure arrangement, there are winners and losers, but the winners benefit by more than the cost that losers suffer. The net worth for biodiversity conservation under the various land tenure regimes ranged from R928 to R3456 to R4160 for municipal land, parkland, and communal land respectively for the Khomani San, compared to R25 600 to R57 600 to R64 000 for municipal land, parkland, and communal land respectively for the Mier.
Many protected areas are not successfully conserving biodiversity, often despite adequate management within their borders. Changes in land use outside protected areas can alter ecological function inside protected areas and result in biodiversity loss given that protected areas are almost always parts of larger ecosystems. Economic incentives are seen as one of the most promising avenues to influence conservation goals. This paper deals with enabling these in the now commonly accepted notion of bioregional landscape management. It suggests a holistic framework to help understand where and how such incentives may function. It then discusses a range of desired incentives, and relate as many of these as possible to potential underlying institutional changes. Without going into country-specific details, several southern African examples are used, all the while relating both principles and examples to bioregionalism. We conclude that incentives for bioregional conservation in southern Africa are far more likely to succeed if key institutions can be introduced.
Global warming and other impending environmental mega-problems call for a new technological paradigm. The urgency of the development and deployment of technological solutions is such that governments will need to make widespread use of ‘carrots and sticks’ to ensure that next-generation technologies are developed and deployed, more demanding standards and regulations are applied and stricter enforcement is guaranteed. To capture the main elements of this paradigm shift, we introduce the concept of Sustainability-oriented Innovation Systems (SoIS). SoIS make particularly high demands on governance, because governments need to disrupt unsustainable technological pathways and encourage alternative technologies long before they reach the stage of commercial viability. This implies picking winners in situations of technological uncertainty and highly disparate stakeholder preferences. SoIS also build on new types of policies that help to internalise environmental costs. The policy-driven nature of technological development may possibly result in a wide divergence of national technological trajectories.